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The Repurchase Agreement (repo) market is an essential part of the financial system. Thus, a               
disruption in the repo market in September of 2019, leading to the first Federal Reserve               
intervention since the Global Financial Crisis, sowed panic. This paper discusses some of the              
possible explanations of the repo crisis, such as tax payments draining liquidity at the same time                
as the Treasury bonds were settled, changes in regulations leading to inability to use the reserves                
on the market, a problem of market domination and change in behavior of the non-bank               
participants. It builds on the theories of the economist Hyman Mynsky and examination of the               
Global Financial Crisis by the economist Thorvald Grung Moe in order to provide some              
background and examine the role of the repo market in the crisis of 2008. The paper discusses                 
changes the market has undergone since the crisis and underlines issues that have persisted such               
as market domination of “too big to fail” institutions, no separation between essential and              
non-essential banking, shadow banking and its role on the repo market. It reaches a conclusion               
that the disturbance in the repo market might have been yet another consequence of evolution of                
the financial markets away from relationship banking and towards market-based liquidity           
provision. 
 
Key Words​: Repurchase Agreement Market, Financial Market, Financial Crisis, Federal          
Reserve 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On September 16th, 2019 there was a disruption in the repurchase agreement (repo) market and               
the interest rates shot up way above the Federal Reserve’s target rate. This can be seen in figure                  
1 which shows the treasury weighted average daily rates for the past year.  
 
Figure 1 -  Treasury Weighted Average Daily Rate for Repo Market 
Source: “DTCC GCF Repo Index.” The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. Accessed May 1st, 2020.                
http://www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index#qna. 
 
This led to the intervention by the Federal Reserve, which injected more than 50 billion               
dollars of liquidity on the next day and has not stopped intervening in the market since as seen on                   
figure 2. The intervention managed to keep the repo rate below the Fed Target. There was a                 
sharp decline in repo rate in late March. This drop was caused by the economic disturbance                
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caused by the global Pandemic of Covid-19, consequences of which will be discussed later in the                
paper, as well as the Fed’s increased purchase of the securities on the repo market as a response.  
 
 
Figure 2  - Overnight Repurchase Agreements: Total Securities Purchased by the Federal Reserve in the 1
Temporary Open Market Operations From June 2019 until end of April 2020 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 30                  
2020 
 
The Fed has not been involved in the Open Market Operations since the Global Financial               
Crisis (GFC) of 2008 (as seen in figure 3). Since the GFC, it was expected that the Fed would                   
not need to act as a lender of last resort. The need for intervention emphasized acuteness of the                  
situation. The period of intervention has been further prolonged by the crisis brought on by the                
global pandemic of Covid-19.  
1 Note that there are several breaks in the graph. There is no official explanation provided, it could be either due to 




Figure 3 - Overnight Repurchase Agreements: Total Securities Purchased by the Federal Reserve in the Temporary 
Open Market Operations from 2008 until 2020 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 30                  
2020 
 
The sudden spike in the repo rate would not have been as significant or worrisome if the                 
Fed did not have to intervene in order to stabilize the market for such a prolonged period of time.                   
The events of September left many wondering whether this could have been the beginning of a                
new financial crisis. It leads one to wonder if the disruption in repo markets point to a bigger,                  
institutional problem. It is especially noteworthy that the financial system does not lack reserves              
- in fact as shown on figure 4, even though the amount of excess reserves has been declining                  
since 2017, it was still quite high in September of 2019. Thus, some wondered whether there                
were circumstances inducing panic in the bankers that led them to hoard their reserves. Many               
different explanations of what could have caused the disturbance emerged. Some of the             
explanations put forward include the regulation changes since the GFC; a combination of large              
amounts of Treasury bonds being settled and quarterly tax payments; the issue of market              
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Figure 4 - Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions  2
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 30                  
2020 
 
This paper aims to first, give an overview and a background of the repo market, discuss                
the different explanations of the crisis put forward, and finally, shortly examine the impact of the                
pandemic. I will discuss the role of the repo market in GFC and the changes that have been made                   
since, in order to argue that the break was a sign of a deeper institutional issue and an inevitable                   
consequence of the evolution of financial markets away from relationship banking towards            
market-based liquidity provision.  
 
 
2 The spike at the beginning of 2020 in excess reserves is caused by unprecedented levels of the Fed’s open market 




How the Repo Market Works 
The repurchase agreement, or repo, is “a sale of a security or a portfolio of securities, combined                 
with an agreement to repurchase the security or portfolio on a specified future date at a                
prearranged price” . It is a way for banks to finance their activities overnight. As the securities                3
“provide credit protection in the event that the seller (ie the cash borrower) is unable to complete                 
the second lag of the transaction” , a repo could be compared to a collateralized loan.  4
A bi-party repo transaction happens between two parties - one that provides collateral, in               
other words securities, and one that provides cash, who will be later called a dealer. The                
collateral providers are usually asset managers, insurance companies, pension funds and hedge            
funds. Cash providers are money market funds and corporate treasurers. However, “Money            
Market Funds (MMFs), asset managers, security lending agents, and investors looking to obtain             
specific securities as collateral in order to hedge or speculate based on changes in market value                
of those securities” can also be cash providers. A collateral provider is usually a client for the                 5
dealer that needs to borrow cash. Picture 1 below illustrates the relationship between the two               
parties.  
 
3 Copelan et al.  2012 
4 Cunliffe, Jon 2017 
5 Copeland et al. 2012 
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Figure  5: Bi-party repo market 
A tri-party repo includes three parties - cash providers, collateral providers and clearing             
banks that step in to facilitate the transactions (shown on Picture 2). In the US another participant                 
of the process is Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), which was created in 2003 to               
ensure efficient and systematic settlement of repo transactions. 
 
 
Figure 6: Tri-party repo market 
 
The difference between the market value of the securities and the value of cash is called                
“haircut”. When the repo is closed, the collateral provider repurchases the security for the              
amount of cash loan it got plus the interest rate. The clearing bank clears the transaction on its                  
own books. In the United States, there used to be two clearing banks - Bank of New York Mellon                   
and JPMorgan Chase, until 2018, when JPMorgan Chase left the tri-party repo business. In short,               
Liz Capo McCormick and Alexandra Harris explained the repo market saying that “Repo deals              
let big investors -- such as mutual funds -- make money by briefly lending cash that might                 
otherwise sit idle, and enable banks and broker dealers to get needed financing by loaning out                
securities they hold in return” . 6
6 McCormick and Harris  2019 
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The tri-party repo market has two predominant segments - tri-party funded by nondealers             
and the General Collateral Finance (GCF) repo market. In the segment of the market funded by                
nondealers, the cash providers are primarily MMFs and other institutional cash providers. They             
mainly seek interest gain on short maturities. “Together, MMFs and securities lenders account             
for over half of tri-party repo lending” . The General Collateral Finance repo market is the               7
so-called blind-broker market, where the parties involved in the transaction do not know the              
identity of each other.  
 
Timeline of Development of the Repo Market 
The repo market did not always exist in the form it does now. Before the 1980s daily overdrafts                  
could have been carried overnight. The Fed discouraged this through penalties. In the 1980s, the               
intraday overdrafts began to rapidly grow, causing the Fed’s concern . “The Fed embraced             8
money supply targets and viewed bank’s reserve positions as a critical policy lever.” The growth               9
of the overdrafts was driven by an increasing transfer of securities using Fedwire. “By 1988, four                
Clearing banks together accumulated 70% of daily overdrafts attributable to movements of            
securities over Fedwire” . This was in part driven by growing repo activities. The capital              10
requirements restricted use of repos by bank dealers, but their use by non-bank dealers tripled at                
the time reaching around 286 billion dollars on average annually by 1985 . This also was the                11
year when the Fed decided to step in the market and imposed a cap of three times the level of                    
regulatory capital, but it did not cover the overdrafts generated by transfer of securities via               
7 Copeland et al. 2012 
8 Gabor 2019 
9 Gabor 2019 
10 Gabor 2019 
11 Gabor 2019 
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Fedwire and thus failed . From 1986 to 1993, Securities-related overdrafts doubled . This led             12 13
the Fed to take other measures and on April 14th of 1994, it started charging clearing banks a fee                   
on daily overdrafts . In the next six months overdrafts shrank by 40 percent . Salomon Brothers               14 15
came up with a solution - a tri-party repo market, and in time of the collapse of overdrafts, banks                   
embraced it .  16
Fast forward to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when Lehman Brothers collapsed. The             
market was left with only two US tri-party agents - JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York                 
Mellon. In response to the GFC the Fed decided that banks should have more liquidity available                
at any point. This led to the Fed starting to pay interest on excess reserves to encourage holding                  
cash. Additionally, new regulations were put in place. In 2010 and 2011 Basel Committee on               
Banking Supervision agreed on Basel III, which puts in additional liquidity requirements for the              
banks. It was initially scheduled to be introduced between 2013-2015. In 2013, implementation             
of Basel III was extended until March of 2018. In the same year Volcker rule was introduced by                  
the Obama administration. The Volcker rule is a ​“​federal regulation that prohibits banks from              
conducting certain investment activities with their own accounts and limits their dealings with             
hedge funds and private equity funds, also called covered funds” . It aimed to separate the               17
banks’ speculative activities from their essential activities. In times of crisis the banks had to be                
bailed out because their downfall could have had a negative impact on the payment              
infrastructure, as the non-essential and essential activities performed by banks were not            
12 Gabor 2019 
13 Gabor 2019 
14 Gabor 2019 
15 Gabor 2019 
16 Gabor 2019 
17 Toussaint 2019  
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separated. The need for this segregation will be discussed later in the paper. The Volcker rule                
took three years to be written and was issued in 2013. It was later revised and softened by the                   
Fed and four other regulatory agencies under the Trump administration in August 2019 . The              18
amendments that were first proposed in 2018 aimed to simplify the rule . The most significant               19
change made was a revision of the trading account definition, “which defines the scope of the                
proprietary trading provisions of the Volcker Rule.”  As summarized by the Fed: 20
Under the revised rule, firms that do not have significant trading activities will             
have simplified and streamlined compliance requirements, while firms with         
significant trading activity will have more stringent compliance requirements.         
Community banks generally are exempt from the Volcker rule by statute. The            
revisions continue to prohibit proprietary trading, while providing greater clarity          
and certainty for activities allowed under the law. With the changes, the agencies             
expect that the universe of trades that are considered prohibited proprietary           
trading will remain generally the same as under the agencies' 2013 rule.  21
 
The rules came into effect on January 1st, 2020 and the banks have to comply by January 1st of                   
2021. Thus, it is still too early to see the impact the amendments might have.  
In 2018 JPMorgan Chase left its tri party repo business, leaving the Bank of New York                 
Mellon as the only US clearing bank. In March of the same year Basel III was implemented. This                  
brings us to current events - on the 16th of September, 2019 the repo rates shot up, which led to                    
the Fed injecting liquidity in the market every day since September 17th. A major question that                
rises is why the Fed has to inject liquidity in the markets, even when there’s excess reserves. As                  
18 Onaran 2019 
19 Gould 2019 
20 “Volcker Rule 2019 Final Amendments: Summary and Proprietary Trading Flowcharts.” 2019.  
21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2019 
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can be seen on figure 4 on page 8, the total reserves level, even though it has decreased since                   
2015, is still very high.  
JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Damon noted that “[banks] have a tremendous amount of             
liquidity, but also have a tremendous amount of restraints on how they use that liquidity” . This                22
leads us to a common argument that the restrictions and reserve requirements are too tough on                
banks, leaving them unavailable to use the money they have. On the other hand, there’s an                
argument that the banks are simply using the situation to get the requirements to ease up. As Eric                  
Toussaint noted, “The problem is not a structural lack of liquidity but the use banks make of the                  
liquidity available to them[...] they use liquidity placed at their disposal to buy up massive               
amounts of debt which sooner or later will lead to a major new crisis” .  23
 
Interest Rates and How They Work 
As explained in the Federal Reserve’s ​The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, “The              
Federal Reserve conducts the nation’s monetary policy by managing the level of short-term             
interest rates and influencing the availability and cost of credit in the economy” . Thus, a sudden                24
spike in the interest rate is problematic, as it shows that the Fed failed to manage the level of                   
short-term interest rate in order to achieve its mandated goals. The Fed has a target range for the                  
Federal Funds rate, which can be seen on figure 7. 
22 Selgin 2019 
23 Toussaint 2019 




Figure 7 - Effective Federal Funds Rate and Target Range  
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.                  
Louis, April 30 2020 
 
The Federal Reserve cannot directly control the market interest rate or the Federal Funds              
rate. It uses one of its three main monetary policy tools - discount rate, to target the Federal                  
Funds rate. The discount rate is the interest rate charged to commercial banks by the Federal                
Reserve when they borrow from their lending facility, which is called the discount window. The               
discount rate is set by the Board of Governors. The Discount window is used by depository                
institutions to finance any funding shortfalls by the end of the day. Figure 8 shows that the                 
Effective Funds rate does indeed follow the trends of the Discount Rate. Another line shown on                
the graph shows the interest rate the Federal Reserve pays on excess reserves. The interest paid                




Figure 8 - Effective Federal Funds Rate, Interest Rate on Excess Reserves, Discount Rate  
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), International Monetary Fund (IMF) retrieved from                
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 30 2020 
 
Reserve requirements are used to stabilize the short-term interest rate. In absence of the               25
reserve requirements, banks only use reserves to settle payments . As explained by economist              26
Scott Fullwiler In his paper ​Modern Central Bank Operations - The General Principles​, contrary              
to what mainstream economics suggests, reserves provide no constraints on lending . The banks             27
make loans disregarding the reserves and if they lack reserves to meet the requirements by the                
end of the day do a repo with the Fed, borrow from the discount window or borrow from other                   
banks on the overnight market. Fullwiler explains that demand for reserves is highly inelastic .               
“If there are too many or too few balances relative to banks’ demand, the interbank rate will                 
respectively fall to the rate paid by the central bank on balances or rise to the central bank’s                  
penalty rate” . Thus, the interbank rate fluctuates between the interest rate paid on excess              28
25 ​Bindseil 2004 p.202 
26 Fullwiler 2008 p.15 
27 Fullwiler 2008 p.15 
28 Fullwiler 2008 p.15 
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reserves and the discount rate. In fact, Fullwiler states as one of his ten general principles of                 
modern central bank operation” that the target rate should stay between the two. According to               29
Fullwiler banks are incentivised to hold excess reserves for four reasons. First, holding excess              
reserves reduced the chances of the bank ending the day in overdraft, reducing the chances of                
increase in interbank rate. Second, it decreases the inelasticity of demand for the reserves. Third,               
holding reserves decreases uncertainty for both banks and central banks concerning the amount             
of reserves demanded at the target rate. And finally, because of decreased inelasticity of demand               
for reserves, the need for the central bank to intervene in order to meet the target rate might                  
decrease . Before 2003 the Fed used to set the discount rate below the target rate. Since there                  30
are non-monetary costs associated with using the discount window, if the reserves were             
insufficient and could not meet the demand, the federal funds rate could increase considerably.              
If the reserves exceeded the existing demand, the fed funds rate could fall well below the target                 
rate . While it should be specified that the quantity of reserves does not define the central bank’s                 31
ability to achieve the target rate, paying interest on reserves decreases potential volatility. “The              
corridor set by the central bank’s penalty rate and the rate paid on reserve balances sets the limit                  
for potential deviations from the target rate” . The fed funds rate mostly stays between the               32




29 Fullwiler 2008 p.2 
30 Fullwiler 2008 p.15-16 
31 Fullwiler 2008 p.18 
32 Fullwiler 2008 p.20 
 
19 
Why This Matters  
Volatility in the repo market pushed the federal funds rate up and above the Federal Reserve’s                
upper limit. It shot up to 2.30% when the upper limit was 2.25% . This happened “just as the                  33 34
Fed was preparing to drop the ceiling to 2%” . In fact, the Fed lowered the upper limit for the                   35
federal funds rate target to 2% on September 19th, two days after the spike . As the interest rate                  36
is one of the biggest mechanisms the Federal Reserve uses for its monetary policy, this sudden                
spike does not speak well for it and gives an idea that the Federal reserve must have made a                   
mistake somewhere along the line. “If it persists, it could undermine the belief of those in the                 
financial markets that the Federal Reserve can effectively apply monetary policy as it intends” .              37
Although the spike in Repo market rates might not have had a huge impact on the economy as a                   
whole, the concern is that it might be a result of a bigger, systemic problem. As explained in the                   
quarterly review of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the repo market helps financial              
markets function smoothly by allowing them to redistribute liquidity among each other. Thus, a              
substantial disruption in the market could easily ripple down through the entire financial system.              
As repo markets are used by banks to get the necessary liquidity, if it freezes up it could disrupt                   
banking. As will be explained in the next chapter, “The freezing-up of repo markets in late 2008                 
was one of the most damaging aspects of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC)” .  38
33 ​Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2020 
34 ​Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) May 2 2020 
35 McCormick and Harris. 2019  
36 ​Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) May 2 2020 
37 Phillips. 2019 
38 Avalos and Eren. 2019 
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Chapter 2: Background and history 
The discussion of the importance of the repo market and the role it plays in the modern economy                  
is nothing new. In fact, it played an important role in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.                  
Economist Thorvald Grung Moe discussed the role of the repo market in the GFC in his paper                 
Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: How to Achieve a Better               
Balance between Global and Official Liquidity. ​He writes that “‘the repo machine’ ... was at the                
center of the financial crisis in the US” . There were several aspects to the issues around the                 39
repo market - collateral, rehypothecation and shadow banking. Before diving into these issues in              
detail, it’s important to do a short overview of the crisis.  
 
What led to the GFC 
For several years before the crisis the economy seemed to be doing well. This period of boom                 
increased confidence in actors of the financial sector and led to increased risk taking. The events                
of the GFC were predicted by the theorems put forward by Hyman Minsky, which will be                
discussed in the following paragraph. They also are in line with John Cassidy’s stage model of                
credit circle - “displacement, boom, euphoria, profit taking, and panic” . In this case, the              4041
displacement was caused by excitement about the short-term interest rates being lowered to one              
percent by the Fed and an unexpected influx of money in treasury bonds. This led to the ​boom of                   
the economy. Next came ​euphoria - banks and other financial organizations started taking more              
39 Moe  2012 p. 59 
40 Cassidy 2008 
41 Cassidy calls this Minsky model, but it deviates from Minsky’s own explanation and is more consistent with 
Charles P. Kindleberger’s 
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and more risks and making unreliable loans, including subprime mortgages; they also started             
bundling up these loans and selling them to the third parties in the form of mortgage backed                 
securities. First, the increased risk taking led to ​profit​. But inevitably the fifth stage came - ​panic​.                 
It started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Inevitably, stability led to instability as                
Minsky suggested in his “financial instability hypothesis, which suggests that the financial            
structure of advanced capitalist economies becomes more fragile over a period of prosperity” .  42
The Financial Instability Hypothesis consists of two theorems. The first theorem dictates            
that under certain financing regimes the economy is stable, while under others it is unstable. The                
second theorem suggests that when the economy has a prolonged period of upswing, it tends to                
transition from financing regimes that make it stable to those that make it unstable. “In               
particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a               
financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight                
to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.” Hedge financing units are the ones that can                43
pay both principal and interest by their cash flow. Speculative units can only pay interest and not                 
principle. Ponzi units cannot repay either principle or interest with their cash flow and have to                
either sell assets or borrow in order to repay debt . As the economy was doing well before the                  44
GFC, financial firms started taking more and more risks. They were trying to separate risk and                
responsibility. Financial innovations such as Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and securitization           
helped them achieve this goal. The banks would bet on the default of the borrower - they would                  
package the loans into securities and sell them, shifting the risk off of their balance sheets; they                 
would also make Credit Default Swaps, making it so that the bank would win in the case of                  
42 Whalen 2012 p. 2 
43 Minsky 1992 p.6 
44 Minsky 1992 p.7 
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borrower’s default. Banks would securitize risky loans, sell CDSs on those securities and then              
securitize the CDSs, creating debt on debt on debt. ​Minsky believed that “the banks are central to                 
the operation of a capitalist economy and that the assets and liabilities of banks largely determine                
the financial framework of the economy” . Thus, as banks increasingly engaged in speculative             45
activities, the financial framework of the economy became more fragile.  
Another factor contributing to the increased fragility of the system was financialization,            
which Krippner defines as a “pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through              
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” . During this process            46
the financial sector grew and became the most important part of the economy. As manufacturing               
firms branched out into the financial sector, they became more vulnerable to the financial crisis.               
The entire economy became more fragile. This was only amplified by the fact that the financial                
sector was dominated by few institutions that were deemed to be “too big to fail” - these                 
institutions were so big that their downfall could have had a significant impact on the entire                
economy, thus the Fed would bail them out to avoid the crisis. This policy only gave these                 
institutions opportunity for increased risk taking, as they knew that in case of crisis the Fed                
would come to the rescue. Finally, an important contributing factor was the rise of money               
managers and shadow banking, which will be discussed later in the paper.  
 
Collateral Crunch 
As the panic grew, banks went to the Fed for liquidity support. “With the markets depending on                 
several trillion dollars’ worth of repo funding, the recent scramble for eligible collateral has led               
45 Wray and Nersisyan 2010 p.4 
46 Krippner 2005 p. 173 
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to a “collateral crunch.” Some have observed that “collateral may soon become the key              
determining factor behind which financial institutions remain profitable and which don’t.””           47
Usually central banks accept good collateral. But valuation of collateral is inherently subjective.             
The value of collateral usually decreases in crisis, when demand for credit from the central bank                
is high, creating a tension between need for liquidity support and collateral rules. During the               
crisis banks would try to deposit the lowest quality collateral possible at the Fed and find                
alternative uses for higher quality collaterals to possibly gain higher returns. As ECB executive              
board member Chailloux observed, banks would try to use less liquid collateral than the central               
government bond with the Fed, as there was no demand for them on the market, while                
government bonds were used on interbank repo market . The Fed could have chosen to only               48
accept high-quality collateral, but this might have led to some solvent illiquid banks failing. By               




As explained above, “Banks could use their high quality collateral to obtain repo-financing,             
thereby providing pledgeable collateral for the daisy-chains of rehypothecation in the shadow            
banking system” . Rehypothecation is when one institution posts a collateral to its prime broker,              49
which uses this collateral for its own purposes, so lends out a posted collateral. Moe states this                 
re-pledging of collateral alongside increased securitization and leverage as factors that led to the              
47 Moe 2012. p. 25 
48 Chailloux and McCaughrin 2008 p.5.  
49 Moe 2012 p. 26 
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credit boom, which then collapsed in 2008 . Rehypothecation is how shadow banks fund             50
themselves. In other words, they reuse collateral that they have posted with banks. Shadow banks               
are entities extending credit outside the banking system. They made up an increasingly large              
part of the financial system and were significant contributors to the GFC. 
Minsky identifies current phase of capitalism as “money manager capitalism” , which is            51
“the economic system characterized by highly leveraged funds seeking maximum returns in an             
environment that systematically under-prices risk” . So financial markets have become          52
increasingly dominated by institutional investors such as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds,            
etc. that are run by money managers who aim to maximize profit. Money managers were               
looking for new ways of increasing returns, including basically gambling with using riskier             
assets. Other ways of augmenting returns were landing cash on repo market or securities lending              
. During the crisis, these financial institutions suddenly withdrew their funding, which at that              53
point was a volatile part of the repo market, leading to “repo runs”.  
Rehypothecation played a crucial role in the augmentation of the impact this had on the               
financial system. Because the same collateral was posted for different transactions, “several            
additional actors will be affected by a failure of one key institution” . Singh and Aitken claimed                54
that the size of the shadow banking system was not documented accurately, and in reality,               
including hypothecation, was bigger . “U.S. banks typically rehypothecate ‘collateral received          55
that can be pledged’ with European banks and vice versa. The U.S. and European markets are                
50 Moe 2012 p. 36 
51 Wray and Nersisyan 2010 p.4 
52 Wray 2009 p.4 
53 Moe 2012 p. 39 
54 Moe 2012 p. 39  
55 Singh and Aitken 2010 
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roughly equal in size; hence we add about 50% of the $10 trillion pledged collateral figure for                 
the U.S” . The previous estimate of the US shadow banking system at the end of the year of                  56
2007 was $20 trillion . After the $5 trillion is added, the total number goes up to $25 trillion.                  57
This, the shadow banking sector in 2007 was almost twice as big as the traditional banking                
sector, which was estimated at $13 trillion . 58
The US bankruptcy laws regarding repos and rehypothecation aided their growth. “In the              
2005 revision of the law, derivatives and repo transactions were exempted from the general              
“temporary stay” provision” . Temporary stay provision in case of bankruptcy “ freezes            59
creditors’ claim [...] and, where a voidable preference can be shown, forces creditors to return               
assets collected during the period immediately preceding the bankruptcy filing” . As repos are             60
exempt from this provision, in case of bankruptcy the lender gets the collateral back. This               
protection makes repo transactions more attractive, as creditors can exit quickly in case of              
bankruptcy of their counterparty, while the debtors get access to inexpensive short-term loans             
that otherwise would be unavailable to them.  
 
What changed since the GFC 
After the GFC the Fed started paying interest on excess reserves. This was meant to decrease the                 
opportunity cost of holding cash. Before the GFC banks preferred to hold loans and securities in                
order to minimize their cash holdings. But the GFC showed the need for increased liquidity in                
the financial system. As a response to the crisis the Fed used an unconventional monetary policy                
56 Singh and Aitken 2010 
57 Pozsar et al 2010 
58 Singh and Aitken 2010 
59 Moe 2012 p. 40 
60 Maclachlan 2014 
 
26 
- Quantitative Easing (QE). This meant that the Fed injected liquidity into the market by buying                
securities. The Fed used several rounds of QE. The first round was initiated in November of                
2008 when the Fed proposed to buy around $100 billion worth of agency debt and around $500                 
billion worth of mortgage-backed securities. In March of 2009 the Fed purchased $850 billion              
worth of mortgage-backed securities and debt and spent another $300 billion on longer-dated             
treasuries. The second round of QE started in November of 2010. By mid 2011 the Fed bought                 
$600 billion worth of longer-dated treasuries. In September of 2011 the Fed initiated Operation              
Twist “with the aim of increasing the average maturity of the bank’s treasury portfolio. Hence,               
the Fed purchased $400 billion worth of treasuries with maturities between 72 and 360 months,               
and sold off an equal amount of treasuries that had maturities in the 3-36 month range.” In                 61
September of 2012 the third round of QE began. The Fed spent around $40 billion monthly on                 
mortgage-backed securities. The program ended in October of 2014 . As a result of these              62
policies, banks started accumulating reserves as is shown on figure 4. In October 2017 the Fed                
started to run down its balance sheet, leading to a contraction in the amount of reserves. Since                 
September of 2019 the amount of excess reserves has been increasing again.  
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) quarterly review of December            
2019, at the same time banks’ holdings of US treasuries increased. From mid-2018 the US               
banking system, which used to be a net-provider of collateral, became a net-provider of funds.               
This change was mainly driven by the four big banks dominating the industry , the role of which                 63
is going to be discussed in the next chapter.  
61 Trefis Team 2015 
62 ​Trefis Team 2015 
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There were changes in non-bank participants of the repo market as well. “Market             
commentary suggests that, in preceding quarters, leveraged players (eg hedge funds) were            
increasing their demand for Treasury repos to fund arbitrage trades between cash bonds and              
derivatives.” So, the repo market was becoming dominated by institutional investors again, just             64














64 ​Avalos and Eren 2019 
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Chapter 3: Explanations  
It has already been mentioned that there are different potential explanations of what caused the               
spike in the interest rate in repo markets in September. This chapter will discuss four possible                
angles that the disruption could be looked at. The first will be a combination of Treasury bonds                 
being settled and quarterly tax payments being due. The second will be changes in regulation.               
The third reason is the domination of the market by several big institutions. And lastly a change                 
in non-bank participants of the market.  
 
Treasury Bond Settlements and Taxes 
One of the explanations of the spike in interest rate in repo markets in September blames a                 
combination of two factors - settlement of Treasury bonds and corporate taxes being due. As the                
Treasury bonds matured, the amount of securities circulating in the market and being ready to be                
sold on the repo market suddenly dropped, decreasing the supply. At the same time the               
companies and banks paid taxes, draining the amount of funds ready to be used on the repo                 
market. According to Internal Revenue Service's ​Tax Calendar for use in 2019 ​tax payments for               
the third quarter of 2019 for corporations were due on September 16th . This event alone should                65
not have disturbed the market as it did, as the tax payments are quarterly and due every three                  
months. Additionally, in 2017 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ("TCJA") was signed into law. The                
Act “reduced the top corporate income tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent” , which means                66
65 Internal Revenue Services 2018 
66 Tax Policy Center 
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the money taken out of the market in 2019 would actually be a lower percentage of revenue than                  
before.  
Since September, there was another period with the same events, but the repo market              
managed to survive. On December 16th taxes for the fourth quarters for corporations were due               
and so were the treasury payments . The combination of the same events did not affect the                67
market, although the Fed at the time was still injecting money in the market.  
 
Regulations 
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 there have been several regulatory changes that have               
affected the banking sector. One of the biggest changes was brought by Basel III, on which the                 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision agreed in 2010 and 2011. Although initially it was set               
to be implemented by 2015, in 2013 its implementation was extended until March of 2018. Basel                
III “enhanced minimum capital and liquidity requirements” set in place by Basel II. “Increasing              68
the level of capital requirements to ensure that banks are sufficiently resilient to withstand losses               
in terms of stress” was one of the main goals of Basel III, alongside improving the quality of                  69
the capital. Basel III increased Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) from 2% to 4.5% and additional                
Capital Conservation Buffer of 2.5% . The minimum total capital ratio remained at 8%. After              70
adding the Capital Conservation Buffer, “the total amount of capital a financial institution must              
hold [is brought up to] 10.5% of risk-weighted assets, of which 8.5% must be tier 1 capital”  . 71
67 “Despite the Fed's Efforts, the Repo Market Risks More Turbulence.” 2019.  
68 IBM Knowledge Center  
69 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2017 
70 IBM Knowledge Center 
71 IBM Knowledge Center 
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So what does this change in regulation mean? Increased capital conservation buffer            
means banks have to have more capital against assets, which in turn decreases capital leverage               
ratio. Common Equity Tier 1 mostly includes cash and stock; increasing its requirement means              
banks have to hold more cash and stock against their assets than before. In other terms, the                 
liquidity requirements are increased. Banks use the repo market to get the liquidity they need to                
meet the obligation. Thus, as the liquidity requirements increase, demand for repo increases too.              
Consequently, “The big banks’ lobby claims that the amount required is too high and that this                
accounted for the crisis of 17 September 2019.” Basel III also demanded higher quality of the                72
capital. For regulatory requirements, both reserves and Treasuries have the same standing and             
are high-quality liquid assets. “But in practice, especially when managing internal intraday            
liquidity needs, banks prefer to keep reserves for their superior availability.” This explanation             73
claims that the rise in interest rate on the repo market was caused by a rise in demand for repos,                    
which was caused by stricter regulations which require banks to have higher liquidity ratios. It               
should not be denied that the regulations might have played a role in the disruption of the repo                  
market. On the other hand, the financial institutions could simply be using the disruption of repo                
market  to lobby against the regulations.  
It is interesting to mention that while discussing Basel III Moe writes that it “ will reduce                 
the need for future liquidity support from central banks.” The underlying argument was that              74
higher liquidity ratio and stricter rules about collaterals would “strengthen banks’ balance sheets,             
improve their liquidity position, and in general make them more robust” . One worry Moe had               75
72 Toussaint 2019  
73 Avalos and Eren  2019 
74 Moe 2012  p. 72.  
75 Moe 2012  p. 72.  
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was that the reforms would be too timid and too late. Eight years later, the Fed is facing another                   
crisis and is put in a position where it has to provide liquidity support again. Ironically, one of                  
the factors blamed for the crisis is the set of regulations that was supposed to make the financial                  
sector stable and help the Fed avoid having to provide liquidity support. The Fed needing to                
provide liquidity support again indicates that the Basel II regulations failed to work as they were                
intended to. This might indicate that since the GFC the banks have changed their behavior. It                
also leaves us with a question of what part of the regulation failed. Moe writes that the                 
regulations that were being put in place were not in fact radical enough and proposed five                
additional regulations to be added - global leverage ratio, divorcing payment system from risky              
lending activity, limiting the MMLR role of central banks, tougher collateral rules in central              
banks and ending the “too big to fail” policy . While Basel III proposed bank-specific leverage               76
ratios, Moe worried that would leave off banks' off-balance sheet activity, which was an issue               
with “sizable volumes of pledged collateral that churn between banks and nonbanks” . It also              77
would not target rehypothecation. Imposing global leverage limits would link these bank-specific            
regulations to the bigger problem of global liquidity becoming too large.  
The second policy proposal was to “Divorce the payment system from risky lending             
activity” . During the crisis banks were bailed out because they performed functions that were              78
deemed to be critical for the economy, such as providing payment infrastructure. But, this is only                
part of the services banks provide. Thus, it has to be determined which parts of banks are                 
actually essential or “systemic” and should be saved in times of crisis. But the line between                
essential and non-essential services provided by banks are highly blurred. The Volcker rule, as              
76 Moe 2012  p. 73  
77 ​Pozsar and Singh 2011 
78 Moe 2012 p.75 
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mentioned before, “generally prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading or            
investing in or sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds” . It aims to separate speculative               79
trading and other, essential banking activities. While the Volcker rule was supposed to decrease              
speculative activities of the banks and draw a line between essential and non-essential activities,              
Moe believed that it was not enough to protect payment systems in times of crisis. His critique                 
was that it would take a long time to be implemented and would need in-depth discussions of the                  
margins. He was right - Volcker rule became a law in 2010 as part of Dodd-Frank reform, but                  
took three more years to write and was issued in 2013, because of disputes about “how to                 
separate prop trading from market-making and hedging” , as predicted. The rule came into             80
effect in 2015, only to be softened by the Trump administration in 2019 . As an alternative,                81
Moe discusses a proposal put forward by James Tobin, an economist who has served on the                
Council of Economic Advisers as well as the Board to Governors of the Federal Reserve. Tobin                
“suggested that we need a new payment system based on “deposited currency” guaranteed by the               
state” . The proposal entails some sort of an electronic cash system, that could be run by banks                 82
or by the central bank itself. The system would be used by the public for essential banking                 
services. Commercial banks would still retain their functions; they would still offer deposit             
accounts and payment services. The main benefit of such a system is that in times of crisis banks                  
will not be indispensable, they will no longer be providing essential payment services, so              
troubled banks will not have to be bailed out because of worries about systematic consequences.  
79 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System January 30 2020  
80 ​Onaran 2019 
81 ​Onaran 2019 
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The third policy proposal put forward by Moe is what he calls a “new Bagehot rule” .                83
The initial response to the GFC was based on Bagehot’s rule, which dictates that “central banks                
should lend freely in a crisis on good collateral at a high rate of interest.” The new rule that                   84
Moe puts forward would make it clear that banks would not get liquidity support for speculative                
activities in times of crisis. The speculative activities should be constrained in times of upswing               
of the economy, so that when the central banks provide liquidity support in downturn, it is not                 
for speculative activity. The rule would be in favor of protection of the public, instead of large                 
banks. Moe writes that the best approach to the central bank acting as a lender of last resort is                   
that of Minsky, who believed that the central bank should provide liquidity support in times of                
crisis, as the last option, but should take tough regulatory measures any other time. He believed                
that central bank acting as the lender of last resort should lead to changes in favor of hedge                  
financing, while the central banks should discourage speculative and Ponzi financing . Minsky            85
and Whalen wrote: 
An essential prerequisite for establishment of a "good financial society" (the term            
was used first by Henry Simons) in the early 21st Century is a Federal Reserve               
that continues to prevent debt deflations through its lender-of-last-resort powers.          
In addition, the Federal Reserve needs to focus more attention on qualitative            
credit controls (i.e., refusing to guarantee or prohibiting purchase of certain types            
of assets, particularly those likely to experience speculative price swings) than on            
quantitative controls.  86
 
In other words, they did believe that the Fed should act as a lender of last resort when needed,                   
but as mentioned before, there were some limitations as to what extent and in which cases the                 
83 Moe 2012 p.76 
84 Moe 2012 p.6 
85 ​Minsky 1986 p. 364  
86 Minsky and Whalen 1996 p.14  
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role should be used. Additionally, they believed that the Fed should focus on controlling the               
quality of the collateral, which brings us to Moe’s next policy proposal - enforcement of tough                
collateral rules by central banks. This would prevent banks from using cheap collateral, which              
contributes to the increased fragility of the system. This policy would go hand in hand with the                 
previous two - in order to have tough collateral policies, speculative activities of the banks               
should be restricted and essential payment functions of banks should be separated from their              
non-essential activities. “The real bills doctrine” aimed to impose strict collateral rules - “By              
limiting the type of paper eligible for rediscount, the Federal Reserve ensured that reserves were               
just sufficient to underwrite production without promoting speculation” . Although, the doctrine           87
had to be revised during the Great Depression as shortage of eligible paper constrained the Fed’s                
supply of liquidity. This experience dictated that reinstating a similar policy might not be wise.               
Still, some kind of restrictions on collateral quality is needed.  
Finally, Moe believed that the size limit should have been enforced on largest SIFIs -               
Systemically Important Financial Institutions. After the crisis the banking industry became even            
more concentrated. As Minsky wrote, “If a bank is too big, the central bank cannot stand aside                 
and allow a bank to fail” . So as long as the financial markets are dominated by few large                  88
institutions, the Fed will act as their lender of last resort and bail them out in case of failure.                   
Domination of the financial market by several big institutions makes it more fragile, as failure of                
one can have colossal effects on the entire system or the economy. The GFC was a clear                 
demonstration of this. However, today the financial market is still dominated by several big              
banks, as will be further discussed next.  
87 Moe 2012 p.77 
88 ​Minsky 1985  
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The GFC left the financial sector in obvious need for stricter regulations. One possibility              
why the economy after 12 years is in a dire situation again could be that Basel III regulations                  
were in fact too strict and led to an increase in demand on repo that the market could not satisfy.                    
On the other hand, the regulation might not have been strict enough, or might have been too late,                  
as predicted by Moe, and did not manage to stabilize the financial sector. One reason why could                 
be that the regulations did not include one of the changes proposed by Moe - to “Stop the ‘Too                   
Big To Fail’ Policy” ; thus, the market is still dominated by several banks. Another reason could                89
be that while the regulations target banks, the repo market is increasingly used by non-bank               
financial institutions. These two factors are discussed next.  
 
A problem of market domination  
After the GFC, the Fed started buying treasuries, up until October of 2017. The termination of                
Treasury purchases had a double effect on the repo market - as the Fed was not buying treasuries                  
anymore, banks and investors stepped in, draining money to be used on the repo market,               
decreasing supply; some used the repo market to finance these purchases, thus increasing the              
demand. In 2018 the Trump administration decreased corporate taxes, increasing the budget            
deficit. More treasuries were sold because of the procedures adopted that dictate that outstanding              
bonds should grow to match the deficit. Again, banks and investors drained cash reserves to buy                
the treasuries, supply of cash decreased again. In March of 2019 the yield curve inverted, causing                
some distress and discouraging investors from buying long-term treasuries. Once again cash            
reserves were drained and supply decreased. In August of 2019 the debt ceiling was suspended,               
89 Moe 2012  p. 78  
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leading to US Treasury “draining more than $120 billion of reserves in the 30 days between 14                 
August and 17 September alone, and half of this amount in the last week of that period” . 90
After all these events we get to September 2019 - at this point banks have $1.2 trillion in cash                   
reserves at the Fed . On the repo market they could have earned higher interest, but still they did                  91
not lend the cash. While some, as explained above, blame stricter regulations, the problem seems               
to be not that they are too strict, or the reserves are not enough, but that they are concentrated in                    
large banks, “which have to keep a level of high-quality, liquid assets on their balance sheets” .                92
The US repo market is dominated by four banks that act as lenders. This can be seen on figure 9                    
- the top four banks are biggest providers of net liquidity. While other banks are still net                 
borrowers, liquidity provided by the top four banks has spiked dramatically since the GFC.              
According to a quarterly review of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), “As the              
composition of their liquid assets became more skewed towards US Treasuries, their ability to              
supply funding at short notice in repo markets was diminished” .  93
 
90 Avalos and Eren 2019 
91 Tilford et al. 2020 
92 Tilford et al. 2020 




Figure 9 - The big four banks turned into key lenders in the repo market 
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Call Reports 031, 041 and 002. BIS calculations.              
Retrieved from Avalos, F., Ehlers, T., & Eren, E. “September stress in dollar repo markets: Passing or structural?”                  
BIS Quarterly Review. December 08, 2019 
 
Non-bank Participants 
Shadow banking, as explained by Moe, played a crucial role in the GFC. It might have played a                  
role in the spike of the rate in September as well. Since before the GFC repo market became                  
increasingly used by non-bank entities. Shifts in their behavior could have also played a role.               
“Market commentary suggests that, in preceding quarters, leveraged players (eg hedge funds)            
were increasing their demand for Treasury repos to fund arbitrage trades between cash bonds and               
derivatives” . Since 2017 Money Market Funds (MMFs) have broadened the range of the repo              94
94 ​Avalos and Eren 2019 
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counterparties they lend to to include hedge funds. The spike in September suggested a              
reluctance to lend on the part of the MMFs. “Market intelligence suggests MMFs were              
concerned by potential large redemptions given strong prior inflows. Counterparty exposure           
limits may have contributed to the drop in quantities, as these repos now account for almost 20%                 
of the total provided by MMFs.” Economist Joseph LaVorgna suggested that the fact that there               95
was no spike in the fed funds rate, a rate at which banks provide loans to each other overnight,                   
meant that the problem was not in the banking sector . This would imply that the spike was in                  96
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Chapter 4: Covid-19 and Repo Market 
The global Pandemic has disrupted the normal flow of the world, including the financial markets.               
As the markets are struggling, the Fed started injecting more money into them. This led to an                 
increase in supply in repos, leading to a decrease in the repo rate as is shown on the figure 1 on                     
page 5. The Fed is adding money to the market with repos - The $100 billion cap on overnight                   
repos has been exceeded as the Fed continuously offers $175 billion in overnight repos as well               97
as $45 billion in two-week operations .  98
The Fed cut the rate by half percentage point, leading to Treasury yields dramatically              
falling . This was the most substantial one-time cut since the Global Financial Crisis . So what               99 100
was the reason behind the cut? Many believe that “the fire [the Fed] was trying to put out was                   
actually in the repo market” - one that started long before the pandemic. Lower Fed Funds rate                  101
was supposed to encourage banks to lend to each other. Although, it did not work as if banks                  
were not willing to lend at 1.5%, they would be even less willing to lend at 1%. Since this                   
outcome was easily predictable, why would the Fed still lower the rates? One theory is that it had                  
to respond with some policy action; an alternative would have been more controversial             
Quantitative Easing. So the Fed went with lowering rates just to show it took action and is still in                   
control.  
 
97 Derby 2020  
98 Cox 2020 
99 Derby 2020  
100 Brown March 9, 2020 




Figure 10 - Effective Federal Funds Rate  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis April 30,                  
2020 
 
Treasury bill buying by the Fed started in September and was supposed to be over               
sometime in the second quarter, but the recent development in the markets have changed the plan               
. The Fed announced purchases of Treasuries worth $60 billion. It also widened the range of                102
Treasuries purchased, which until now had to be short term T-bills and now include “bills, notes,                
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities and other instruments”.   103
The Fed’s discount window is open to only licensed depository banks , while the repo              104
market is open to hedge funds and shadow banks as well. So as the Fed pours billions of dollars                   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The repo market is an important part of the financial system, so a spike in repo rates which led to                    
the Fed injecting billions of dollars in the market for several months was a sign of worry for                  
many. While many explanations were offered, it seems that the disruption is a sign of a deeper                 
systemic problem. Although maturing treasuries and taxes have been blamed, these are recurring             
events that have happened since the spike without causing any further disruption. Basel III              
regulations are commonly blamed as well, as they increased liquidity requirements, so the banks              
have to hold more reserves than before. While this could lead to increased demand for repo                
lending in order to meet the requirements, it also begs the question of why banks are not lending                  
on the market when they have large amounts of excess reserves.  
In order to find an answer we might have to look back at the last crisis and how the                   
markets have changed since. The Repo market played an important role in the GFC in 2008 and                 
even though some regulations were put in place, it has not become a safer part of the financial                  
system since. Some of the issues that became evident during the GFC were the “too big to fail”                  
banks, shadow banking, rehypothecation and quality of collateral. All these aspects contributed            
to increased fragility of the economy. During the 2008 crisis banks had to be bailed out by the                  
Fed as their failure could have affected the entire economy. Additionally, banks performed             
essential activities such as providing payment infrastructure. But these activities were not            
divorced from risky lending activities. So as the Fed was bailing out banks, it was not only                 
saving the essential part of the bank, but also the non-essential one that increased fragility of the                 
economy because of its risk-taking in the first place. Although the Volcker rule tried to separate                
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the two, it took too long to be implemented and was softened before it could have any effect. The                   
financial system is still dominated by four big banks, who have become net lenders on the repo                 
market. The increase in the repo rate might indicate their reluctance to lend. A possible               
explanation is that these banks have to hold reserves because of Basel III regulations. Since these                
four banks are the net lenders, their reluctance to lend could result in a disturbance of the entire                  
market. Additionally, the repo market is also highly used by non-bank financial institutions and              
shadow banks.  
The most recent developments and the economic crisis brought on by the global             
pandemic makes it hard to say what would have been the long-term impact of the disturbance of                 
the repo market alone. Still, there is reason to say that since the GFC not enough has been done                   
to make financial system less fragile and to avoid the need for the Fed to act as a liquidity                   
supplier - the market is still dominated by “too big to fail” banks, essential and non-essential                
banking are not separated, shadow banks still pose a threat. The disturbance in the repo market                
might have been yet another consequence of evolution of the financial markets away from              











Date Interest rate on excess reserves Effective Federal Funds Rate  
2008-10-01 0.84 0.97 1.25 
2008-11-01 0.94 0.39 1.25 
2008-12-01 0.61 0.16 0.50 
2009-01-01 0.25 0.15 0.50 
2009-02-01 0.25 0.22 0.50 
2009-03-01 0.25 0.18 0.50 
2009-04-01 0.25 0.15 0.50 
2009-05-01 0.25 0.18 0.50 
2009-06-01 0.25 0.21 0.50 
2009-07-01 0.25 0.16 0.50 
2009-08-01 0.25 0.16 0.50 
2009-09-01 0.25 0.15 0.50 
2009-10-01 0.25 0.12 0.50 
2009-11-01 0.25 0.12 0.50 
2009-12-01 0.25 0.12 0.50 
2010-01-01 0.25 0.11 0.50 
2010-02-01 0.25 0.13 0.75 
2010-03-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2010-04-01 0.25 0.20 0.75 
2010-05-01 0.25 0.20 0.75 
2010-06-01 0.25 0.18 0.75 
2010-07-01 0.25 0.18 0.75 
2010-08-01 0.25 0.19 0.75 
2010-09-01 0.25 0.19 0.75 
2010-10-01 0.25 0.19 0.75 
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2010-11-01 0.25 0.19 0.75 
2010-12-01 0.25 0.18 0.75 
2011-01-01 0.25 0.17 0.75 
2011-02-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2011-03-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2011-04-01 0.25 0.10 0.75 
2011-05-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2011-06-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2011-07-01 0.25 0.07 0.75 
2011-08-01 0.25 0.10 0.75 
2011-09-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2011-10-01 0.25 0.07 0.75 
2011-11-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2011-12-01 0.25 0.07 0.75 
2012-01-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2012-02-01 0.25 0.10 0.75 
2012-03-01 0.25 0.13 0.75 
2012-04-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2012-05-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2012-06-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2012-07-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2012-08-01 0.25 0.13 0.75 
2012-09-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2012-10-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2012-11-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2012-12-01 0.25 0.16 0.75 
2013-01-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2013-02-01 0.25 0.15 0.75 
2013-03-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2013-04-01 0.25 0.15 0.75 
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2013-05-01 0.25 0.11 0.75 
2013-06-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2013-07-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2013-08-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2013-09-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2013-10-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2013-11-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2013-12-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-01-01 0.25 0.07 0.75 
2014-02-01 0.25 0.07 0.75 
2014-03-01 0.25 0.08 0.75 
2014-04-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-05-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-06-01 0.25 0.10 0.75 
2014-07-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-08-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-09-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-10-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-11-01 0.25 0.09 0.75 
2014-12-01 0.25 0.12 0.75 
2015-01-01 0.25 0.11 0.75 
2015-02-01 0.25 0.11 0.75 
2015-03-01 0.25 0.11 0.75 
2015-04-01 0.25 0.12 0.75 
2015-05-01 0.25 0.12 0.75 
2015-06-01 0.25 0.13 0.75 
2015-07-01 0.25 0.13 0.75 
2015-08-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2015-09-01 0.25 0.14 0.75 
2015-10-01 0.25 0.12 0.75 
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2015-11-01 0.25 0.12 0.75 
2015-12-01 0.37 0.24 1.00 
2016-01-01 0.50 0.34 1.00 
2016-02-01 0.50 0.38 1.00 
2016-03-01 0.50 0.36 1.00 
2016-04-01 0.50 0.37 1.00 
2016-05-01 0.50 0.37 1.00 
2016-06-01 0.50 0.38 1.00 
2016-07-01 0.50 0.39 1.00 
2016-08-01 0.50 0.40 1.00 
2016-09-01 0.50 0.40 1.00 
2016-10-01 0.50 0.40 1.00 
2016-11-01 0.50 0.41 1.00 
2016-12-01 0.64 0.54 1.25 
2017-01-01 0.75 0.65 1.25 
2017-02-01 0.75 0.66 1.25 
2017-03-01 0.88 0.79 1.50 
2017-04-01 1.00 0.90 1.50 
2017-05-01 1.00 0.91 1.50 
2017-06-01 1.13 1.04 1.75 
2017-07-01 1.25 1.15 1.75 
2017-08-01 1.25 1.16 1.75 
2017-09-01 1.25 1.15 1.75 
2017-10-01 1.25 1.15 1.75 
2017-11-01 1.25 1.16 1.75 
2017-12-01 1.40 1.30 2.00 
2018-01-01 1.50 1.41 2.00 
2018-02-01 1.50 1.42 2.00 
2018-03-01 1.58 1.51 2.25 
2018-04-01 1.75 1.69 2.25 
 
47 
2018-05-01 1.75 1.70 2.25 
2018-06-01 1.86 1.82 2.50 
2018-07-01 1.95 1.91 2.50 
2018-08-01 1.95 1.91 2.50 
2018-09-01 1.98 1.95 2.75 
2018-10-01 2.20 2.19 2.75 
2018-11-01 2.20 2.20 2.75 
2018-12-01 2.28 2.27 3.00 
2019-01-01 2.40 2.40 3.00 
2019-02-01 2.40 2.40 3.00 
2019-03-01 2.40 2.41 3.00 
2019-04-01 2.40 2.42 3.00 
2019-05-01 2.35 2.39 3.00 
2019-06-01 2.35 2.38 3.00 
2019-07-01 2.35 2.40 3.00 
2019-08-01 2.10 2.13 2.75 
2019-09-01 1.98 2.04 2.50 
2019-10-01 1.79 1.83 2.25 
2019-11-01 1.55 1.55 2.25 
2019-12-01 1.55 1.55 2.25 
2020-01-01 1.55 1.55 2.25 
2020-02-01 1.60 1.58 2.25 
2020-03-01 0.63 0.65 0.25 
2020-04-01 0.10 0.05 
 
Table 1 - Monthly Interest Rate on Excess Reserves, Effective Federal Funds Rate and Discount Rate 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), International Monetary Fund (IMF) retrieved from                










“Despite the Fed's Efforts, the Repo Market Risks More Turbulence.” The Economist. 




“DTCC GCF Repo Index.” The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. Accessed May 
1st, 2020. ​http://www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index#qna​.  
 
“The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions” 10th ed. ​Federal Reserve System 
Publication​, 2016. P.21 
 
 “Volcker Rule 2019 Final Amendments: Summary and Proprietary Trading Flowcharts.” 




Avalos, F., Ehlers, T., & Eren, E. “September stress in dollar repo markets: Passing or 
structural?”  BIS Quarterly Review. December 08, 2019. accessed April 13, 2020 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1912v.htm 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms” 
December 2017 
 
Bindseil, Ulrich. “Monetary Policy Implementation: Theory, Past, and Present.” 2004. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System “Agencies Finalize Changes to 
Simplify Volcker Rule.” October 8, 2019. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20191008a.htm​. 
 





Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Federal Funds Target Range - 
Upper Limit [DFEDTARU], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 




Brown, Ellen. “The Fed's Baffling Response to the Coronavirus Explained.” Truthdig, 
March 9, 2020. 
https://www.truthdig.com/articles/the-feds-baffling-response-to-the-coronavirus-explained/​. 
 
Brown, Ellen. “The Fed Protects Gamblers at the Expense of the Economy.” ​WEB OF 
DEBT BLOG​, January 10, 2020. 
https://ellenbrown.com/2020/01/10/the-fed-protects-gamblers-at-the-expense-of-the-economy/ 
 
Cassidy, John. “The Minsky moment”, ​The New Yorker​, Feb 4, 2008, 
www.newyorker.com 
 
Chailloux, Alexandre, S. Gray, and R. McCaughrin. “Central Bank Collateral 
Frameworks: Principles and Policies.”  2008. IMF Working Paper 08/222. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Copeland, Adam, Darell Duffie, Antoine Martin, and Susan McLaughlin. “Key 
Mechanics of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 
2012. 
 
Cox, Jeff “Fed to Pump in More than $1 Trillion in Dramatic Ramping up of Market 




Cunliffe, Jon,  “Repo Market Functioning”. CGFS Papers, No 59. Committee on the 
Global Financial System, Bank for International Settlements. April 2017 
 
Derby, Michael S. “Fed's $100 Billion Repo Intervention Falls Short Of Bank Demand.” 






Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Effective Federal Funds Rate [EFFR], retrieved 
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EFFR, May 2, 
2020. 
 
Fullwiler,  Scott T. “Modern Central Bank Operations - The General Principles”  June 
2008 Available at SSRN: ​https://ssrn.com/abstract=1658232  
Gabor, Daniela. “How RTGS killed liquidity: US tri-party repo edition”​ ​FT Alphaville​, 




Gould, Jonathan V. ​ “Volcker Rule: Final Rule.” OCC, November 14, 2019. 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2019/bulletin-2019-56.html​. 
 




Internal Revenue Services   “Tax Calendars.”  Publication 509. Nov 14, 2018 
 
Krippner, G. 2005. “The Financialization of the American Economy.” Socio-Economic 
Review, vol. 3, iss. 2 
 
Maclachlan, Fiona “Repurchase agreements and the law: how legislative changes fueled 
the housing bubble” For presentation at The annual meeting of the Association for Evolutionary 
Economics, Philadelphia, PA; January 3 - 5, 2014 
 
McCormick, Liz Capo, and Alexandra Harris. “Analysis | The Repo Market's a Mess. 




Minsky, Hyman P., "Money and the Lender of Last Resort" Hyman P. Minsky Archive. 
31. 1985 ​https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/31  
 




Minsky, Hyman P. “The Financial Instability Hypothesis” Working Paper No. 74 May 
1992 
 
Minsky, Hyman P., and Charles J. Whalen “Economic Insecurity and the Institutional 
Prerequisites for Successful Capitalism” Working Paper No. 165 May 1996. 
 
 
Moe, Thorvald Grung “Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity 
Support: How to Achieve a Better Balance between Global and Official Liquidity” Working 
Paper No. 712. 2012  by. SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/ssrn.2033959.  
 
Onaran, Yalman. “The Volcker Rule.” Bloomberg.com. ​Bloomberg​, August 20, 2019. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-volcker-rule​. 
 
Phillips, Matt. “Wall Street Is Buzzing About Repo Rates. Here's Why.” ​The New York 
Times​. The New York Times, September 18, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/business/fed-repo-rates.html​. 
 
Pozsar, Zoltan and M.Singh. “The Nonbank-Bank Nexus and the Shadow Banking 
System..”  IMF Working Paper 11/289. 2011. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund  
 
Pozsar, Zoltan, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft and Hayley Boesky, “Shadow Banking,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 458, July 2010 
 
Robb, Greg. “Shadow Banks Could Be Playing Role in Repo-Market Drama, Economist 




Selgin, George. “Reflections on the Repo-Market Imbroglio - Alt-M.” ​Alt-M​, October 6, 
2019. ​https://www.alt-m.org/2019/10/03/reflections-on-the-repo-market-imbroglio/​. 
 
Singh, Monmohan and J. Aitken. “The (sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow 
Banking System” IMF Working Paper 10/172. 2010 Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund 
 





Tilford, Cale, Joe Rennison, Laura Noonan, Brendan Greeley, and Colby Smith. “Repo: 
How the Financial Markets' Plumbing Got Blocked.” ​The Financial Times​. The Financial Times 
, January 14, 2020. ​https://ig.ft.com/repo-rate/​. 
 
Toussaint, Eric. “Another Look at the Federal Reserve's Panic in September 2019 and 




Trefis Team. “Quantitative Easing In Focus: The U.S. Experience.” ​Forbes​. Forbes 




Whalen, Charles J.,  “Understanding Financialization: Standing on the Shoulders of 
Minsky” Working Paper No.892. 2012 
 
Wray, L. Randall  “Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis” 
Working Paper No. 578. 2009 
 
Wray, L. Randall and Yeva Nersisyan “The Global Financial Crisis and the Shift to 
Shadow Banking” Working Paper No. 587. 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
